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[L. A. No. 18998. In Bank. Mar. 27,.1945.]

CLARA GRHrIM, Respondcnt, v. WALTER E. GRIMM, et at,
as Administrators, etc., Appcllants ..
[1] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Insurance Policy.
-Where the premiums on an insurance policy issued on the
.husband's life are paid wi~h community funds, the policy is
community property.
[2] Id. - Community Property-Disposition--Voluntary Transfer
as Voidable. - Although an insurance contract may provide
that the insured husband has the right to change the beneficiary without the wife's consent where she is named as such,
any change of beneficiary without her consent and without
a valuable consideration is voidable, and after the husband's
death the wife may maintain an action for her community
share in the proceeds of the policy.
[8] Insurance - Beneficiaries - Nature of Beneficiary'.lDterest.The interest of a beneficiary designated by an insured who
has the right to change the beneficiary is, like thai of a legatee
under a will, a mere expectancy of a gift at the time of the
insured's death.
[4] Assignments - Interests Assignable - Expectancies. - .4.n. assignment or release of an expectancy becomes enforceable in
equity when the expectancy has developed into a right.
[5] Id. - Interests Assignable-Expectancies.-A contract constitutes an equitable assignment or renunciation of an expectancy
only if' it expressly or by necessary implication so provides.
[6] Husband and Wife - Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-Courts weigh carefully the language of property
settlement agreements before concluding that they eliminate
rights the disavowal of which is not necessarily connected
with the purpose of such agreeements.
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[2J Application of community property system to problems
arising in connection with insurance policies, note, 114 A.L.R. 545,
554. See, also, 3 CalJur. lO-Yr. Supp. 622: 11 Am.Jur. 197. _
[3] See 14 OaLJur. 583; 29 Am.Jur. 952.
[4] Validity and eft'ect of transfer or expectancy by prospective
heir, notes, 17 A.L.R. 597; 44 A.L.R. 1465; 121 A.L.R. 450. See,
also, 3 Oal.Jur. 251; 9 Cal.Jur. 478; 4 Am.Jur. 270.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Husband and W~e, § 56; [2] Husband and Wife, § 103(5); [3] Insurance, § 221; [4,5] Assignments,
§ 25; [6] Husban.d and Wife, § 157(6); [1] Wills, § 239; Insuranoe,
1225; [8] Husband and Wife, 1151(8). .
' ...
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[7] Wills - Revocation: Insurance - Beneficiaries -- Change of
Beneficiary.-Since a hushand has th(> poY,er to rHok,' hi~
will or to change belleficiaries named in an in~lll'allc(> poliey,
his failure to do so ordinarilv indicntes that h(' did not wish to
effect a change and in eff;ct amounts to a confirmatioll of
the will or the designation of the wife in the policy. B"th
instruments are to be read as expressiug the decc(]('nt's intentions at the time of his death.
[8] Husband and Wife - Property Settlement Agreements - Effect.-A property settlemeut agreemeut in which the wife
relinquished all interest in the husband's insurallce policy
payable to her did not show an intention to give up more than
her community rights therein, and a provision that he could
change the beneficiary indicated that there was no immediate
change and that she would remain the beneficiary unless he
exercised his right to change the beneficiary. And an intention to exclude from the agreement rights that might accrue to
the wife at the husband's death as a result of his bounty
was indicated by a further provision that she waived all rights
of inheritance except as might be provided in his will.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Myron Westover, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for declaratory relief.
affirmed.

Judgment for plaintiff

John J. Craig and Rush M. Blodget for Appellants.
Stephen Monteleone for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-ln January, 1941, plaintiff and Lewis
Grimm were divorced. In December, 1939, they entered into
a property settlement agreement that provided for a division
of their community property, which included an insurance
policy on the life of the husband, issued in 1930 and naming
the wife as beneficiary. The agreement made this policy the ...
separate property of the husband and gave him the right to
change the beneficiary. He died in April, 1943, without having made such a change. He had not remarried, and he left
no issue. After his death, plaintiff claimed the proceeds of
the insur~nce policy as the beneficiary thereof and brought
this action for a declaration of her rights. The insurance company under stipulation paid the money due on the policy into
MJ.rt and was dismissed from the action. The trial eourt
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entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant.s, the tldministrators of IJewif: Grimm's estate, appeal. Defendants COlltend that tIle est.ate is entitlcrl to the proceeds on the ground
that the agl'eement bet ween t he spouses term ina teo all rights
of plnintiff with respect to the policy, including the right to
recei\'e the insurance money as the benefieiary thereof.
[1] All prcmiums were pnicl with communit~, funds and
the policy was thf'rcfore cOTllmnnit.y property at the time of
the property settlement agn>(,nlent. (1'mvciers Ins. CO. Y.
F01lcher, 219 Cal. 35],356 12fi P.2rl 482]; Blethen v. p([cific
]f[u.(. L. Ins. Co., ]98 Cal. 91. 09 [243 P. 431J; New York 1>-i[tJ
Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal.App. 602, 606 [214 P. 61];
Jenkins v. .Jenkins, 112 Cnl.App. 402, 409 1297 P. 5G1.)
[2] It is settled that even though the insurance contract
Illay provide that the insured husband has the right to cha.nge
the beneficiary without the wife's consent where she is named
as such. any 'change of beneficiary without her consent and
without a valuable consideration is voidable, and after the
death of thE' husband the wife may maintain an action for
her community share in the proceeds of the policy. (Alaznwn
v. Brown, 12 Cal.App.2d 272, 275 [55 P.2d 53ft]; Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Fancher, supra, at p. 356: Dixon Dumber Co. v. Peacock, 217 Cal. 4Hi, 418 [lft P.2d 2331: B7ethen v. Pacific 'Af1d.
L. Ins. Co., supra, at p. 101: see 3 CaI.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. 622;
114 A.L.R. 545, 554.) A wife, however, can release this community interest in the insurance policy and stilI be a bencfieiar? thereof. If she executes such a release and the husbanil
revokes hif; designation of her as beneficiary she has no right
to the insurance proceeds upon his death; but if he fails to
revoke his designation of her as ben efi eian' , she is entit.led,
like any other beneficiary, to the pro('eeds of the policy at the
time of his death. She would not be entWed to such proceeds,
howE'ver, if the parties agreed that no rights were to a('('rne
to her, even thoug-h she remained the beneficiary at the time
of the husband's death. It remains t.o be determined. therefore, whether the spouses in the present case agreed, not only
that the policy should become the separate property of the husband, but that no right..q should accrue to plaint.iff even
though she remained the hrneficiar? at the time of the husband's death.
[3] Tke interest of a belleficiary designated by an insured
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who has the right to change the beneficiary is, like that of a
legatee under a will, a mere expectancy of a gift at the time
of the insured's death. (Page v. Washington Mutual Life
Assn., 20Cal.2d 234, 242 fl25 P.2rl 20]; CookY. Coole, 17 Cal.
2d 639, 644 [111 P.2d 322); Blethen v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins.
Co., ]98 Cal. 91, 98 [243 P. 431] ; Mn.hony v. Crocker, 58 Cal.
App.2d 1%, 202 [136 P.2d 81O}; JlIutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Franck,9 Cal.App.2d 528,537 [50 P.2d 480]; FIack v. Metz,
173 S.C. 413 [176 S.E. 314. 95 A.L.R. 196]; see 14 Cal.Jur.
583: 29 Am.Jur., Insurance. § 1276, p. 952.) [4] An assignment or release of an expectancy becomes enforceable in
equity when the expectancy has developed into a right. (Ben·
nett v. Forrest, 24 Cal.2d 485. 492 rJ50 P.2d 4161: Estate of
Crane, 6 CaI.2d 2]8 [57 P.2d 476, 104 A.IJ.R. 1101) j Anglo
California Nat. Bank v. Kidd, 58 Cal.App.2d 651, 655 [137
P.2d 460]; Bridge v. Kedon, ]63 Cal. 493, 500 [126 P. 149,
43 L.R.A.N.S. 404]; Estate of Edelman, 148 Cal. 233, 238
[82 P. 962, 113 Am.St.Rep. 2311; Estate of Garcelon, 104
Cal. 570, 584 r38 P. 414. 43 Am.St.Rep. 134. 32 L.R.A. 595];
see 17 A.L.R. 597; 44 A.L.R. 1465; 121 A.L.R. 450; 3 CaLJur.
251; 9 Cal.Jur. 478; 4 Am.Jur., Assignments, § 51, p. 270.)
[5] It is settled, however, that a contract constitutes an
equitable assignment or renunciation of an expectancy only
if it expressly or by necessary implication so provides. (Estate of Jones, 118 Cal. 499, 502 [50 P. 766, 62 Am.St.Rep.
2511 see 4 Pomeroy, Equity ,Jurisprudence, § 1290.) [6] In
interpreting property settlement agreements courts weigh
carefully the language of the agreements before concluding
that they eliminate rights the disavowal of which is not necessarily connected with the purpose of such agreements. (Estate of 'McNutt, 36 Cal.App.2d 542. 549 [98 P.2d 253]; Girard
v. Girard, 29 N.M. ] 89 [221 P. 801, 35 A.L.R. 1493).) This
court and other courts have therefore applied to property
settlement agreement'! the rule that general expressions or
clauses in such agreements are not to be construed as including an assignment or renunciation of expectancies and that
a beneficiary therefore retains his status under an insurance
policy or under a will if it does not clearly appear from the
agreement that in addition to the segregation of the property
of the spouses it was intended to deprive either spouse of the
right to take property under a will or an insurance contract
of the ·other. (Sandroskll v. P"udential Ins. Co., 217 Cal.
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578 [20 P.2d 325]; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 112 Cal.App. 402, 407
[297 P. 56) ; Estate of Crane, supra, p. 221; Merchants Nat.
Bank v. Hubbard, 220 Ala. 372 [125 So. 335]; Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. v. Stilley, 271 I11.App. 283; see Girard v.
Girard, 29 N.M. 189 [22] P. 801, 35 A.L.R. 1493]; In re
Sword, 120 l\lisc. 427 [199 N.Y.S. 672] raff'd, 204 N.Y.S:
952]; In re Brown's Will, 153 Misc. 282 [274 N.Y.S. 924,
931 J; In re Griffith's Will, 167 Misc.36G [3 N.Y.S.2d 925,
927J; Weir v. J(ing, (Tex.Civ.App.) 166 S.W.2d 187; Lindley,
Separation Agreements, p. 283.) In Estate of Crane, supra,
this court set forth the considerations that commend the rule
that expectancies under a will or an insurance policy are regarded as waived only when it appears that the attention of
the parties was directed to such expectancies and their intention to disclaim future rights that might develop from such
expectancies was made clear in the contract. [7] Since the
husband has the power to revoke his will or to change the
beneficiary named in an insurance policy his failure to do so
ordinarily indicates that hE' did not wish to effect a change so
that in effect his failure to act amounts to a confirmation of
the will or the designation of the wife in the insurance policy.
Both instrument!'; arE' to be read as expressing the decedent's
intentions at the time of his death. As was said in Estate of
Crane, supra, at page 221: "It is to be remembered that
although the will in which the legacy is contained had been
executed prior to the date of the contract, the testator lived
more than two years thereafter. And a will speaks from and
as of the date of the testator's death.' If the testator had not
executed this will nntilafter t.he date of the property settlement agreement, it would not be reasonable to say that he
was without right to make such subsequent will and thereby
give additional property to his wife. But in substance and
effect he did the same thing by leaving his will unchanged
after the date of said contract." Moreover, while a property
settlement agreement proyides for what the husband is eonceding to his wife as a matter of right, frequently he is willing
to grant more to her as a matter of bounty, for as recognized
in Estate of Crane, supra, at page 221, the affection of spouses
for each other may survive separation agreements and divorce
proceedings.
[8] The property settlement agreement in the present ease
provided; "The parties hereto do mutually covenant and agree

)
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that this agreement is intenued and shall be construed as,
and the same shan be, a complete property settlement between
the parties hereto, and that it comprises, settles and discharges
all claims arising' or existing, or which may hereafter arise
by reason of the marrillge of the parties hereto, and that second party accepts the provision herein mane for her in full
satisfaction of her right to support and mllintenance." This
clause sets fortll -two conditions of the property settlement
agreement: the wife relinquishes her right'! in an the property
that was or by virtue of the agreement became separate propert.y of the husband, and each spouse discharges' all claims
then existing or in the future arising as a result of the marital relationship of the parties. Plaintiff bases her claim to the
insurance proceeds on 'a contract made by the husband in her
favor while the~' were married and left in effect by him after
the property settlement agreement and the divorce. She
makes no claim arising out or the rormer marital relationship,
nor does she assert a right contrary to her general waiver or
all rights in the separate property of the husband.
The property settlement agreement setting forth the community property described the insurance policy as one in
which the wife was named as beneficiary. As to the property
that was to be separate property of the husband, the agreement (designating the husband as first party and the wife
as second party) provided: "All funds and property of every
nature described or referred to in said Exhibit A, other than
the propert~· hereinabove provided to be paid or conveyed to
second part~', and all property hereinabove referred to as
now being the separate property of the first party hereto,
together with all property of any nature hereafter possessed
or acquired by first party shall be and remain the sole and
separate property of gaid first party, and second party hereb~'
conveys, relinquishes and releases to first party all right, title.
interest and claim which she has or might have therein or
thereto. Said first party shall have the right to change the
beneficiary of the life insurance policy, described in Article
VIII of said Exhibit (A), and second party agrees to execute
upon request any instrument necessary or convenient to accomplish such change, and second party hereby transfers,
releases and relinquishes to first party all interest in and to
gaid policy of insurance and the premiums paid thereunder
and the avails thereof." Under this provision the insurance

...
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was like any other community propert)' that was to
become separate property of the hushand. There was no
indication that anything else was intendeo with respect to
the polic~' The express reference in tht' agreement to the
rig1lt of the hushand to change the heneficiary inoicates t.hat
there was no immediate chang!' Imo that tht' wiff' would remain the beneficiary of the polic:,\- unles!,: the hushano exercisco his right to change the hpnpfieiary. It was for thf' hnsband to deciop whether he wishf'o his wife 01' someonf' else t.o
get the proceeds of the policy. Tf the deeedent. intendeo'that
plaintiff. who WaR his wifE- for more than thirty years. shouliJ
have t.he insurance nroceeds. he would natnrally suppose that
his intent.ion would be fulfilled if he did not change the
beneficiary.. It is significant. t.hat. he Hved for Revera} years
after t.he agreement wit.hout making-snch a change. Plaintiff's
agreement to execute upon the husband's requ€st any inst.rument necessary 01' convenient t.o change the beneficiary also
makes it apparent from the face of t.he agreement that there
waSDO pre..c;ent. renunciation of the wife a.q beneficiary. Plaintiff's relinquishment of her intereRt in the "avail!!" of the
policy does not show an intention to give up more than her
community rights. which included 8 Rhare in the proceeds
of the policy. The intention of the spOURes to exclude from
the agreement rights that might accrue to plaintiff at the
death of the hu.c;band as a result of his bounty is indicated by
the provision of the agreement in which plaintiff waived all
rights of inheritance in her hURband'R estate "except in such
manner and upon such termR as may be provided in any will
and/or codicil thereto of first party in effect at the date of
his death." Since the position of a beneficiary named in a
life insurance policy aR an object of the bounty of the insured
is similar to that of a beneficiary of a will (Cook v. Cook, 17
Ca1.2d 639. 646 [11] P.2d 322]), plaintiff no more relinquished
the right to take as beneficiary of her husband's insurance
policy than she relinquished the right to take as beneficiary
of his will. In this respect there is a clear distinction between
the present case and Sullivan v. Union Oil Co., 16 Ca1.2d 229
[105 P.2d 922]. on which defendants mainly rely. In that
case the parties to the property settlement agreed that" 'each
hereb~' waive any and all right to the estate of the other
left at his fir her death and forever quitclaim any and all
right to share in the same of the other, ••• and hereby re-

...
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lease and waive all right· to inherit under any will of the
other . . . and from the date of this agreement . . . they
shall have all the rights of single persons and maintain the
same relation of such toward the other'." There was no provision, as in the present case, to indicate that the parties contemplated no present renunciation by the husband of the
wife as beneficiary, but left it to him to decide in the future
whether or not to change the beneficiary. Moreover, the Sullivan case involved, not a contract with an insurance company,
but an "EmployeeR' Provident Fund" maintained by the
husband's employer, to which the husband contributed by
monthly deductions from his salar~·. Under the facts of that
case all interests of the wife in the fund were regarded as part
of her interest in the community property and as such reo
leased in favor of the husband.
'
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

)

SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. The majority opmlOn takes
from the estate of decedent and gives to plaintiff property
("avails" of a specifically described life insurance policy)
in which the latter has no right, title, or interest. By formal
written agreement for a valuable consideration the plaintiff
conveyed to the decedent an of her interest in the a'Va~1s
of the policy. The exact language used by the parties is:
"second party [plaintiff) hereby transfers, releases and reo
linquishes to first party [decedent] all interest in and to said
policy of insurance and the premiums paid thereunder and the
ava~7s thereof." (Italics added.) We cannot give effect to
the words "second party hereby transfers • .. to first party
all interest in and to said policy . . . and the avails thereof"
and still permit plaintiff to recover. We have no right to
give no effect to those words. They are clear and definite in
meaning. The word "transfer" means "to convey from one
. . . person . . . to another." (Webster's New Int. Diet.
(2d ed.).) The majority opinion does not assert, and the
evidence does not suggest, that the decedent ever reconveyed
to plaintiff any interest in, to, or under the policy, or its
"avails." I think that such majority opinion fails to reckon
squarely with the essential problem when it declares that

....
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"Plaintiff's relinquishment of her interest in the 'avails' of
the policy does not show an intention to give up more than
her community rights, which included a share in the proceeds
of t.he policy." (Italics added.) The instrument effects an
out and out conveyance of an interest in the avails of the
policy. An actual conveyance is_more than a relinquishment.
Neither do I find convincing the argument in the opinion
based on the statement that "The intention of the spouses to
exclude from the agreement rights that might accrue to plain.
tiff at the death of the husband as a result of his bounty is
indicated by the provision of the agreement in which plaintiff
woived all rights of inheritance in her husband's estate 'ex·
Mpt in such manner and upon such terms as may be provided
ill any will and/or codicil thereto of first party in effect at the
date of his death'." The foregoing exception is specific and
exclusive. It excepts from operation of the relinquishment
of plaintiff's rights of inheritance from the decedent only
such rights 88 are encompassed in the language "in such manner and upon such terms as may be provided in any will
and/or codicil thereto of first party in effect at the date of
his death." It seems almost trite to have to point out that
the asserted right claimed in this action by plaintiff is not
one which is evidenced or created by "terms . . • provided
in any will and/or eodicil thereto of first party."
It is an established rule of construction that a proviso or
exception is used to li:ffiit and qualify that which immediately
precedes it and to expressly negative a construction or effect
that would prevail in the absence of the proviso or exception;
that which is specifically excepted from the operation of the
general clause would, in the absence of the proviso or exception, have been included within the operation of such general
clause. (17 C.J.S. § 343, pp. 796-797 [rule as to contracts];
see, also, People ex. rel.HappelZ v. Sischo (1943), 23 Ca1.2d
478, 493 [144 P.2d 785, 150 A.L.R. 1431] [rule of statutory
eonstruction].) Furthermore, the express enumeration of
exceptions indicates the exclusion of any other exceptions.
(17 C.J.S. § 343, p. 797 [rule as to contracts]; see, also, Belloc v. Rogers (1858), 9 Cal. 123, 128; f'YMn v. Walker
(1869), 35 Cal. 634, 639 [95 .Am.Dee. 152J; Rothschild v. Superior Court (1930), 109 Cal.App. 345, 348 [293 P. 106J;
C.1.'1'. Corp. v. Biltmore Garage (1934), 3 Cal.App.2dSupp.
D. NH/ (1941), 42 Oal.App.
757, 761 "[36 P.2d 247]; I"

r.

\

182

)

GRIMM V. GRIMM

[26 C.2d

2d 691, 694 [109 P.2d 741] [rule of statutory construction].)
There is no presumption in favor of plaintiff. She had sued
Mr. Grimm, the decedent, for divorce. She contracted with
him freely, upon an equal footing.
The declaration in the opinion that "Since the position of
a beneficiary named in a life insurance policy as an object of
the bounty of the insured is similar to that of a beneficiary
of a will rcitation 1 plaintiff no more relinquished the right to
take as a beneficiary of her husband's insurance policy than
she relinquL"hed the right to take as beneficiary of his will"
seems to me to be a non sequitur. The exception clause expressly reserves to plaintiff the right to take as beneficiary
under a wm or c.odidl thereto but it does not reserve or create
the right to succeed otherwise to avails of the insurance policy,
which policy and the "avails thereof" plaintiff had conveyed
to decedent for a valuable consideration.
The transfer in writing to decedent of all of plaintiff's
interest in and to the policy and its "avails" immediately
divested plaintiff of all her interests in and to such policy and
its "avails" and vested all of such interest in decedent as
his separate property. There was no necessity for him to
change the policy-designated beneficiary; he owned and
there was vested in him all of such beneficiary's interest. She
could thereafter acquire no interest in or right to the policy
proceeds except by affirmative and competent action of the
decedent to that end. He could have made a will or codicil
bequeathing such avails to plaintiff but he did not do so.
He chose to keep such policy and it.c;; avails for himself and
his estate. His estate is now entitled to have them free of any
claim of plaintiff, for which she has long since received fair
compensation and of which she divested herself by voluntary
action.
The provision in the agreement by which plaintiff bound
herself to execute upon Mr. Grimm's request any instrument
necessary or convenient to change the beneficiary does not, in
my view, make it apparent, as asserted in the opinion, "that
there was no present renunciation of the wife as beneficiary"
in any material sense. Since Mr. Grimm had bought, paid for,
and received a conveyance of plaintiff's entire interest there_
is apparent no essential reason why he should have desired
or thought that he needed to have the poli('~' itself amended
to show a change in the designMed beneficiary 1U1til and

. ~ :.-
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unless he wanted to name some third person as beneficiary.
To accomplish that end he might well have needed plaintiff's
execution of a proper document and, therefore, an appropriate covenant to that end was in<'luded in the agreement, but
in so far as Mr. Grimm's rights against the plaintiff were concerned, if he wanted the avails of the policy to go to his estate,
he already, in the agreement, had everything which he could
reasonably anticipate would be needed.
Lastly, I find no substantial ground for distinguishing this
case from our opinion in Sullivan v. Union Oil Co. (1940)
16 Ca1.2d 229, 233 [105 P.2d 922]. The agreement in that
case provided that "each fhusband and wife] hereby waive
any and all right to the estate of the other left at his or her
death and forever quitclaim any and all right to share in the
same of the other, ... and hereby release and waive all right
to inherit under any will of the other ... and from the date
of this agreement ... they shall have all the rights of single
persons and maintain the same relation of such toward the
other." The agreement in the case now before us seems more
certain and efficacious to the end in question than does that
involved in the Sullivan ease. In addition to the language of
conveyance and relinquishment hereinabove quoted the agreement we are construing provides that "All funds and property of every nature described or referred to in said Exhibit A
[with certain immaterial exception!; but specifically ineluding the mooted policy] . . . together with all property of
any nature hereafter possessed or acquired by first party
[the decedentl shall be and remain the sole and separate property of said first party, and second party [plaintiffl hereby
transfers, conveys, relinql1i!'!hes and releases to first party all
right, title, interest and claim which she has or might have
therein or thereto." (Italics added.)· Here the plaintiff not only
released and relinquished all claim!'! arising out of the marital
status but she expressly conveyed to the decedent an of her
interest in and claim to the precise property in controversy.
Such conveyance. instead of indicating as asserted in the ...
opinion "that the parties contemplated no present renunciation by the husband of the wife as beneficiary," in any material sense, conclusively establishes that the wife thereupon
completely divested herself of all interest under the policy,
specifically including the "avails thereof" and any claim
which she "might have therein or thereto." In other words
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she expressly conveyed to Mr. Grimm all of her interest as
beneficiary and agreed that it should "remain" his "sole and
separate property." Certainly, he could have reconveyed it
to her, but he never did so.
As previously shown, there was no occasion or reason for
Mr. Grimm, the former husband, to change the name of the
beneficiary shown in the policy unless and until he wanted
to designate a third person to that status. Since he apparently wished only to have the proceeds go to his own estate he
rested upon the eonveyance from plaintiff which, at least so
far as appears, was never questioned during his lifetime and
the due exeeution and fairness of which are not now questioned. We should not now, after his death, enable plaintiff
to gratuitously take from his estate that which was his.
The judgment should be reversed.
Carter, J., concurred.

)

Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 23,
1945. Carter, J., and Sehauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
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